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Co-Insurance Clauses
H E co-insurance clause is one of the
Tmost
frequently used, most severely

criticized, and most misunderstood of the
insurance clauses in general use today.
Yet it is the most reasonable and the most
equitable of them all. In Europe the fairness of the co-insurance clause is well established, the majority of the countries making its use compulsory by law. In the
United States its use is mandatory in some
states, optional in others, and prohibited
entirely in some western and southern
states. However much has been said and
written on co-insurance, there are still
many, even some actively engaged in the
insurance business as well as legislators and
policyholders, who do not understand its
purpose and operation.
Fire insurance is one of the great necessities of our business, social, and economic
life. The expense of maintaining it should
be distributed among the property owners
of the country as equitably as is humanly
possible. Insurance is in the nature of a
tax. Just as taxes of the government are
used to cover the expenses of running the
government, so the tax of fire insurance
companies is for the purpose of paying the
fire loss of the country. Each policyholder
pays his premium into a fund, which the
fire insurance company distributes among
those who suffer loss by fire. In the event
insurance were to be provided by the state
or national government it is practically
certain that an assessment would be levied
against all property subject to loss from fire

in precisely the same manner as all other
taxes are levied; that is, upon the full
assessable value of the property to be protected. In fact, it is in this manner that
the insurance tax in Germany is assessed.
Since insurance is a tax and since it
is not obligatory in the United States to
insure in total, it becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain equitable principles of
assessment. There should be no discrimination between individuals insuring risks
of equal hazard, just as there should be no
discrimination by a railroad between different shippers receiving identical service.
Each risk should contribute its equitable
proportion of the total sum collected for
loss payments. This effect is secured by
rating the several risks according to their
individual characteristics, crediting each
risk with its favorable features and charging
it with its unfavorable features. Thus,
efforts to reduce fire hazard are encouraged,
and the consumption of national wealth
by fire thereby is reduced. However, any
such scientific system of rating is impossible without the feature of co-insurance.
If all losses were total, those who insured
in total would receive their reward, while
those who preferred to pay less in premiums
would be penalized accordingly. However,
the records of the leading insurance companies indicate that of all the losses sustained, about 65% (numerically) are $100
or less; about 30% are over $100 and less
than total; and about 5% are total. The
natural inclination, therefore, on the part
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of the public, particularly on the less
hazardous risks, is to under-insure and take
the chance of not having a total loss; and
this will generally be done except under
special conditions.
That discrimination will result if an insurance company promises to pay all losses
in full to the face of the policy while granting all policyholders the same rate per $100
of insurance regardless of the relative
amount of insurance carried on the property, may be illustrated in the following
example: Smith and Jones each own a
building valued at $50,000. They each
insure their building at the rate of 1%
without a provision for co-insurance. Smith
insures his building for $40,000, paying
$400 premium therefor, while Jones insures his building for only $5,000 paying
$50 premium. Suppose each suffered a
loss by fire of $1,000. Smith and Jones
would have equal rights to collect in full
although Smith paid eight times as much
premium as Jones; and this would be true
for any loss up to $5,000.
Looking at it from the point of view of
the insurer, Smith's company had a loss
of 2½% of the policy and the company
insuring Jones had a loss of 20% of the
policy, yet each company received the same
amount of premium per $100 insurance.
It is quite evident that either Smith should
have the benefit of a lower rate or Jones
should have a lower loss collectibility. The
latter feature can be regulated only by
means of a co-insurance clause in the
policy. Without some such provision to
insure equity among a group of policyholders, all those who insure to a relatively
high percentage will be contributing more
than their share to the common insurance
fund to pay the partial losses on policies
taken out for a low percentage of the total
value.
Another illustration of a slightly different
type which illustrates the inequity which
may exist between policyholders is as fol-
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lows : Assume that Company A owns three
different plants, situated in three different
localities, each worth $100,000. Company
B owns a single plant worth $100,000.
From a fire insurance point of view, a fire
in one plant of Company A will not affect
the other two plants, so that Company A
could protect itself fully by taking out a
blanket policy of $100,000, covering all
three plants. In order to secure full protection Company B also would have to
take out a policy for $100,000. If rates are
the same, and if losses are to be paid in full
irrespective of the amount of insurance
taken, it is evident that Company A is
receiving practically three times as much
protection as Company B for the same
premium. To prevent large owners with
numerous items of property from securing
full protection at the expense of small
owners, blanket policies now are written
with a co-insurance clause.
Under a co-insurance clause the insured
becomes co-insurer with the company
unless his total insurance is equal to or
greater than a stipulated percentage of the
sound value of the property. A typical
co-insurance clause reads as follows: "In
consideration of the reduced rate for which
this policy is issued, it is expressly stipulated that in event of loss this company
shall be liable for no greater proportion
thereof than the sum hereby insured bears
to 80 per cent of the cash value of the
property described herein at the time such
loss shall happen. If this policy is divided
into two or more items, the foregoing conditions shall apply to each item separately."
An 80% co-insurance clause is customary,
although any per cent may be inserted.
The last sentence was added to prevent an
interpretation inconsistent with the original
intention of the co-insurance clause in connection with policies containing more than
one item.
Co-insurance brings about an equitable
distribution of risk under partial losses in a
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manner which is automatically taken care is not operative if the insurance carried is
of in total losses; that is, those who pay equal to or greater than the agreed perpremiums sufficient to insure 80% or more centage. It is equally true that the clause
of the sound value are protected fully, is ineffective if the loss is equal to or greater
while those who prefer to pay small pre- than the stipulated percentage of the
miums must bear a proportionate share of sound value even though the insured has
the risk accordingly. A few illustrations failed to comply with the requirements of
of the operation of the clause should make the co-insurance clause. It is applicable
only to cases of partial losses (less than
this clear.
In the following examples it is assumed 80% or the agreed percentage of the total
that the sound value of the property is value) and then only in case the insurance
$100,000 and the policy contains an 80 also is less than the percentage stated.
Many property owners have the impresper cent co-insurance clause or, in other
words, $80,000 of insurance should be sion that they cannot collect more than
taken out to satisfy the co-insurance stipu- 80% of a loss under an 80% co-insurance
clause regardless of the amount of insurlation:
Case No. 1. Policy, $50,000 (50%); ance carried. This view is wholly erronloss, $20,000. The policy is less than eous. The insurance company is liable for
80% of the sound value; hence, the in- 100% of all losses up to the face of the
sured is co-insurer for3/8of the losses and policy when 80% or any amount in excess
the company's liability is
of $20,000, or of 80% is insured. Complete protection
may be obtained by taking insurance for
$12,500.
Case No. 2. Policy, $50,000 (50%); the full value of the property.
The effect of the co-insurance clause is
loss, $90,000. The insured is co-insurer
to the extent of
of the losses, and the to prevent those owners who wish to undercompany's liability is 5/8. However, 5/8 insure from shifting their burdens to others
of $90,000 is $56,250, which is greater than who desire to carry full protection. The
the face of the policy; hence, the loss fire loss is distributed more equitably
collectibility is limited to the face of the among policyholders through the avoidance
policy, or $50,000, and in effect the co- of rate discrimination. The operation of
the clause furnishes an incentive to the
insurance clause is inoperative.
Case No. 3. Policy, $20,000 (20%); policyholder to insure his property fully.
loss, $70,000. The insured is co-insurer
When the policy contains a co-insurance
for
¾of the losses and the company's clause, it is important to take into conliability is
of $70,000, or $17,500.
sideration the changing values of the inCase No. 4. Policy, $80,000 (80%). sured property. For example, take Case
The insured has met the 80% requirement; No. 4 above where the sound value of the
hence, the company is liable for 100% of property is $100,000 and insurance for
all losses up to the face of the policy, or $80,000 (80%,) is carried. As long as the
property value remains at $100,000, the
$80,000.
Case No. 5. Policy, $95,000 (95%). loss collectible will be 100% up to the face
The property is insured for 95% of its of the policy. However, suppose the
sound value rendering the co-insurance market value of the property increased to
clause inoperative. The company is liable $150,000 and a loss of $80,000 takes place.
for 100% of all losses up to the face of the The co-insurance clause specifies the basis
to be "80 per cent of the cash value of the
policy, or $95,000.
It is evident that the co-insurance clause property at the time such loss shall hap-
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pen." Eighty per cent of $150,000 is
$120,000. Since the policy is for $80,000
only, the insured is co-insurer for1/3and
the company's liability is 2/3 of $80,000,
or $53,333. The policyholder should keep
the insurance in force commensurate with
the total value of the property insured.
The same principle is applicable where
the policy containing a co-insurance clause
not only covers the property of the insured
but that of others as well. To illustrate,
a proprietor of a picture and picture
framing establishment had a valuable stock
of his own. He also had in his possession
in storage, framed pictures and other
valuable property belonging to customers.
His policies covered his own property and
that of his customers as well. Both were
damaged by fire originating in a part of
the building not occupied by him.
The sound value of his own property
and the loss thereon were ascertained
readily, but it was necessary to determine
the value of and the loss on customers'
goods. Some of his customers were reasonable in their claims as to the value of
their destroyed property; others were not.
The claims of the latter group augmented
the total value of the property, thus reducing the proprietor's loss collectibility.
As a result of this experience he wisely
decided that thereafter his own property
and the property of his customers should
be covered by separate policies. Other
instances could be cited in which proprietors have been the victims of their own
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generosity either because the customers
made unreasonable claims or the value of
the customers' property happened to be
unusually high at the time of the fire,
reducing proportionately the amount recoverable on the loss suffered on the
proprietors' stock.
Although co-insurance usually is considered in its relation to fire insurance, the
use of the co-insurance clause is not restricted to this form of insurance. The
principle of co-insurance is embodied in
marine insurance the world over. It is
used also in tornado, sprinkler and leakage,
and other forms of insurance. Care should
be taken to see that the stipulated percentage is applied to sound value of the
total property insured and not to any other
figure. For example, if the sound value is
$100,000, $80,000 fire insurance will be
required. Suppose tornado insurance is
taken out on a 50% co-insurance basis, the
amount required will be 50% of $100,000,
or $50,000, and not 50% of the amount
of fire insurance carried, or $40,000—a mistake frequently made in practice.
Through misunderstanding the coinsurance clause may be a source of loss
to the policyholder either through underinsurance or through unforeseen relationships under different policies resulting in
complicated adjustments. In principle,
however, the co-insurance clause is fair to
both insurer and insured. It is indispensable in securing equity among all the
policyholders.

